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NOTES
RECENT U.S. EFFORTS TO CONTROL
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The explosion of a nuclear device by India on May 18, 1974,
initiated a new wave of concern for the prospects of limiting the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.' Subsequent developments such
as the Nixon proposal to provide nuclear materials to Egypt and
Israel2 and the announcement by West Germany of its intentions
to sell Brazil a plutonium reprocessing facility 3 increased fears in

the United States that the number of countries possessing nuclear
weapons would continue to grow at the expense of world peace and
security.' Apprehension is likely to continue since the development
of an atomic bomb blueprint by a Princeton undergraduate, using
publicly available information, demonstrated to the world-and to
the agent of Pakistan who tried to obtain the report-the relative
simplicity of designing an atomic bomb.
The United States government has stepped up its activity and
interest at executive, legislative, diplomatic, and administrative
levels in an effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons.' Increased risks of nuclear war and terrorist blackmail justify this
stimulated activity and call for stronger concerted action in the
face of worldwide diffusion of nuclear material and technology.
Present trends in nuclear energy technology test not only the
United States' position as the leader in this field but also the
ability of one nation to control nuclear proliferation.
Some critics of United States nonproliferation policy have
argued that the possession of nuclear weapons by other nations
might have a stabilizing effect.6 Former Secretary of State Kissin1. M. GurnN, NUCLEAR PARADOX-SECURrry RISKS OF THE PEACEFUL ATOM 2529 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1613, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1976).
2. M. GUHIN, supra note 1, at 29-35.
3. H.R. REP. No. 1613, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1976).
4. Ribicoff, A Market-SharingApproach to the World NuclearSales Problem,
54 FOREIGN AFF. 763 (1976).
5. See B. RATHER, NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND PROLIFERATION:

A

SELECTED

BIBLIOGRAPHY, (Cong. Research Serv. Mar. 15, 1976).

6. Lefever, Undue Alarm Over Nuclear Spread?, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1976,
at 12, col. 4.
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ger, in 1957, wrote that Soviet aggression would be deterred if our
European allies obtained nuclear weapons and that "the diffusion
of nuclear weapons technology will be to our net strategic advantage."' Future members of the nuclear weapon club would not
possess sophisticated weapon delivery systems, a fact which would
severely limit their ability to use nuclear weapons.' Others argue
that if smaller powers engage in a nuclear war it need not develop
into a global disaster and might even serve to promote disarmament through greater awareness of the danger.9
Arguments discounting the need to control nuclear proliferation
are usually overshadowed, however, by concern over the grave consequences of increased membership in the nuclear weapon club.
Proliferation is regarded by most to be a serious danger."0 In a
world of frequent armed conflict, the threat of nuclear weapons use
appears very real. The risk of a nuclear disaster increases in proportion to the number of countries accumulating a nuclear weapon
arsenal.
II.

SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND

The material, equipment, and technology used in the production
of electric energy by nuclear power reactors is much the same as
that needed for the production of an atomic bomb. Improved technology, the free circulation of information concerning nuclear
weapon design, and access to plutonium, a by-product of nuclear
power reactors, has made the development of a nuclear explosive
device easier.
7. H. KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 198 (1957). The validity of this statement vis-a-vis the Soviet Union may still hold: "The potential
nuclear-weapon states would form a nuclear ring, and not necessarily a friendly
one, around the USSR. Countries that now or will in a few years have the capability of going nuclear include Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to the east; Pakistan, Iran, Israel, and Egypt to the south; Yugoslavia, Italy, Switzerland, West
Germany, and Sweden to the west; and Canada to the north. If many, or any, of
these countries decided to go nuclear, the security of the USSR would very clearly
not be enhanced." W. EPSTEIN, THE LAST CHANcE-NucLEAR PROLIFERATION AND
ARMS CONTROL 226 (1976).

8. H.

KISSINGER,

supra note 7, at 197.

9. H. KAHN, ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR 491-92 (1961).
10. "Nuclear proliferation is the greatest danger facing the world today. The
more I get into it the more certain I am that that is the truth." NuclearReduction,
Testing and Non-Proliferation:Hearingon S. Con. Res. 69 Before the Subcomm.
on Arms Control, InternationalOrganizations, and Security Agreements of the
Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976) (statement of
Sen. Symington).
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Plutonium or highly enriched uranium may be used as the explosive component in a nuclear fission (atomic) bomb." Neither plutonium nor highly enriched uranium 2 occur in nature-sophisticated processes must be utilized in order to isolate them. Once
special nuclear material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium)
is isolated, the construction of an atomic bomb-as opposed to
the more complex hydrogen bomb-is relatively simple. Plutonium compressed or imploded quickly through the use of chemical
explosives will produce a nuclear explosion.
Modern breeder reactors utilize plutonium as part of their basic
fuel and create more plutonium than they consume. This type of
reactor magnifies the problem of controlling critical stages in the
nuclear fuel cycle because of the increased supply of plutonium
and the breeder reactors' popularity with nations of all economic
situations.' 3 If fast-breeder reactors come into usage as expected,
the amount of private sector plutonium in existence will approach
1,600 metric tons by the year 2000.14 In comparison, only 5-10
kilograms of plutonium would be needed to equal the explosive
impact of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
during the Second World War.'5
As national economies throughout the world suffer from the effects of paying huge sums for foreign oil, the impetus to develop
alternative energy sources becomes more powerful. Nuclear energy
appears as a desirable alternative to many developing countries
and is necessary for industrial powers such as Japan to maintain
their level of economic development.'" Some nations see the
breeder reactor as a way to achieve energy independence: it was
precisely this rationale which allowed India to justify a chemical
7
reprocessing capability and thus obtain access to plutonium.'
Willrich, Worldwide Nuclear Industry in INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND
55 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).
12. Enriched uranium is uranium in which the concentration of uranium-235
has been increased to facilitate nuclear fission.
13. Address by Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner Victor Gilinsky at M.I.T.
(Nov. 1, 1976).
14. M. GUHIN, supra note 1, at 21-22, citing U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
11.

NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 45,

DRAFr 1 GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT MIXED OXIDE FUEL: RECYCLE PLUTONIUM IN LIGHT WATER-COOLED REACTORS 22-23 (1974).

15.
16.

Willrich, supra note 11.
Sato, Japan's Response to Nuclear Developments: Beyond "NuclearAllergy," in NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND THE NEAR-NucLEAR COUNTRIES 227, 237 (0.
Marwah & A. Schulz eds. 1975).
17. Gilinsky, supra note 13.
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III. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROLIFERATION CONTROL
Two entities are the pillars of international proliferation control:
the International Atomic Energy Agency 8 (IAEA), and the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 9 (NPT). The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, a treaty with over
100 parties, sets up a safeguards system whereby any country,
whether or not a party to the NPT, may voluntarily submit to
inspections, audits, facility design approval, and deposit of nuclear
materials with the IAEA.2 ° No effective sanctions exist under the
IAEA to deter nations from diverting nuclear material to a military
purpose other than detection and announcement to the world community.2" In reality, the IAEA safeguards system is nothing more
than an early warning system which is designed to detect the diversion of nuclear material from civilian use to military or explosive
use. There is no known plan for concerted action by the nations
alerted to deal with a discovered diversion.
In 1963, IAEA safeguards began to apply to United States transfers of nuclear assistance which were formerly controlled by bilateral safeguard agreements.2" Recently the United States has consented to IAEA safeguards over civilian nuclear facilities within
the United States.13 The United States has given support to the
IAEA by predicating economic and military aid to foreign nations
on their participation in the IAEA safeguards system.2 4 Pending
legislation in Congress gives increased financial support to the
IAEA as well as incentives to other nations to encourage their
25
participation in the IAEA safeguards system.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
complements the IAEA by imposing treaty obligations on non18. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, done Oct. 26, 1956, 8
U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 4.
19. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for
signature, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839 [hereinafter cited as
Non-Proliferation Treaty].
20. Szasz, InternationalAtomic Energy Agency Safeguards, in INTERNATIONAL
SAFEGUARDS AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

73, 74-88 (M. Willrich ed. 1973).

21. Id. at 88. See Dagenais, Atomic Safeguards and the Strategy of Treaty
Deterrence, 8 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 211 (1975).
22. Gorove, Transferring U.S. Bilateral Safeguards to the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency: The "Umbrella" Agreements, 6 DUQ. U.L. REv. 1, 2 (1967).

23. 18 INT'L ATOM. ENERGY AGENCY BULL. 76 (1976).
24.

International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L.

No. 94-329, § 305, 90 Stat. 755 (1976).
25. H.R. REP. No. 1613, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1976).
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nuclear weapon states to accept safeguards and by prohibiting the
transfer of special fissionable material (e.g., plutonium) to any
non-nuclear weapon state without IAEA safeguards. " In consideration for foregoing the development of nuclear weapons, the nonnuclear weapon nations receive aid and cooperation in peaceful
atomic endeavors 27 and a promise by the nuclear weapon states of
sincere efforts to effect nuclear disarmament.2 However, like the
IAEA safeguards system which it backs up, the NPT does not
provide for the imposition of sanctions against violators.
Various weak points of the NPT indicate the need for action by
the world community 29 and particularly by the nuclear weapon
states and the nuclear exporter states. The United States and the
Soviet Union were heavily criticized by participants in the 1975
NPT Review Conference for failing to live up to the duty imposed
by Article VI of the NPT to negotiate an end to the nuclear arms
race and to pursue complete nuclear disarmament.30 Article X(I)
allows parties to withdraw from the NPT upon three months notice
if their supreme interests are jeopardized. This provision recognizes the underlying security problems not solved by the NPT.
Article I allows nuclear sales to non-signatories in which only the
material transferred, and not the importer nation's entire nuclear
program, is subject to safeguards. 3t As evidenced by India's nuclear
explosive program, the danger in this situation lies in the ability
26. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 19, art. 3; Szasz, supra note 20, at
75-76.
One commentator has observed that:
The NPT has been unanimously viewed as a discriminatory treaty, even by
the superpowers themselves. Actually, the concept of non-proliferation is in
itself discriminatory; some countries will preserve the fantastic privilege of
possessing a nuclear arsenal, a majority of countries will give up that privilege for twenty-five years. In that sense, the NPT is ultimately a contract
between two groups of countries representing two levels of technological and
economic development and two levels of strategic power.
P. Lellouche, Draft Proposal for Revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 4 (April
1975) (unpublished manuscript-Program for Science and International Affairs,
Harvard Univ.).
27. Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 19, arts. 4(2) and 5.
28. Id., art. 6.
29. See F. BARNABY & R. HUISKEN, ARMS UNCONTROLLED 186 (1975).
30. W. EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 199.
31. Nuclear Reduction, Testing and Non-Proliferation:Hearing on S. Con.
Res. 69 Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, InternationalOrganizationsand
Security Agreements of the Senate Comm. on ForeignRelations, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1976) (statement of Adrian Fisher, chief U.S. negotiator of the NPT).
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of a nation to build up nuclear capabilities with safeguarded material and subsequently duplicate that capability in unsafeguarded
plants with material not obtained from a NPT party.2
Finally, the control of international proliferation is inhibited by
the failure of the NPT to secure the signatures of certain technologically-sophisticated states. Non-signatories include insecure states
which are confronted with powerful neighbors (e.g., Argentina,
Brazil, Chile), and states facing a hostile world community (e.g.,

South Africa) .31
IV.

RECENT EXECUTIVE ACTION

The proliferation problem has become a full-scale public concern in the United States, as was demonstrated by the injection of
the issue into the 1976 Presidential campaign. The final positions
of President Carter and former President Ford were very similar.3 4
In a nuclear policy statement issued shortly before the election,
President Ford sought to control the export of nuclear fuel facilities
by deferring the commercialization of chemical reprocessing and
assuring supplies of nuclear fuel to customer nations.3 5 Calling on
the world to join in a cooperative effort, Ford specifically asked
nuclear supplier nations to avoid the export of reprocessing and
enrichment facilities for three years.36 Ford criticized Congress for
not authorizing earlier expansion of United States uranium enrichment facilities and urged immediate action to increase the United
States' limited uranium enrichment capacity (which has been totally committed to existing customers since 1974).11 For nations
willing to accept safeguards, the statement promised nuclear fuel
at fair prices and "binding letters of intent for the supply of nu32.

Id.

33. See generally Marawah & Schulz, Introductionto NUCLEAR
AND THE NEAR-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES 7

PROLIFERATION

(0. Marawah & A. Schulz eds. 1975).

34. Behind U.S. Crackdown on Spread of Nuclear Know-How, U.S. NEWS &
8, 1976, at 68; King, Carter Stealing Initiatives, NUCLEAR

WORLD REP., Nov.

ENGINEERING INT'L, Oct. 1976, at 4; Keatley, And a Strategem for Upstaging
Carter, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1976, at 22, col. 4.
35. Presidential Nuclear Policy Statement, reprintedin 75 DEP'T STATE BULL.
629, 632 (1976) (policy statement issued by President Gerald Ford on Oct. 28,
1976) [hereinafter cited as Policy Statement]. See Metz, Ford'sNuclear Policy:
An Industrial Bailout, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 1976, at 22, col. 4.
36. Policy Statement, supra note 35, at 632.
37. Id. at 634. See COMMUNICATION FROM PRESIDENT FORD ON THE NUCLEAR FUEL
ASSURANCE ACT OF 1975, H.R. Doc. No. 94-202, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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clear fuel to current and prospective customers." 3 The nuclear
policy statement threatened "drastic sanctions" against diverters
of nuclear material for explosive use,39 promised increased support
for the IAEA, and indicated the need to establish plutonium storage facilities under international control." In a post-election address to the nuclear industry, a high State Department official
reiterated Ford's major points and emphasized that United States
policy should be to place non-proliferation objectives above commercial goals in the supply of nuclear materials."
On May 13, 1976, at the United Nations Conference on Nuclear
Energy and World Order, Jimmy Carter set forth major proposals
to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.12 Carter stated that
nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive nuclear test ban by the
United States and the Soviet Union would prove their good faith
to the non-nuclear weapon nations and provide the necessary atmosphere for adherence to the NPT.4 3 A voluntary moratorium by
all nations on the purchase or sale of uranium enrichment and
chemical reprocessing plants was called for by Carter, who said it
is "absolutely essential" to stop the sale of these plants whether
or not ah agreement has been completed for such sale. 4 He proposed centralized multinational facilities serving groups of nations
with uranium enrichment, chemical reprocessing, fuel fabrication,
and fuel storage services located together in order to minimize the
risks of diversion and environmental contamination. 5 Carter
called for a reevalution of the decision to engage in chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel,46 stressed the necessity of assuring
customer nations an enriched uranium fuel supply,47 and noted the
need for progress in permanent nuclear waste disposal. According
to Carter, the United States chemical reprocessing plant in Barn38. Policy Statement, supra note 35, at 634.
39. Id. at 636.
40. Id. at 635.
41. Irving, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Policies, reprinted in 75 DEP'T STATE
BuLL. 687, 689-90 (1976) (address delivered to the Atomic Industrial Forum by
Asst. Sec. of State Irving on Nov. 15, 1976).
42.

Carter, Three Steps Toward Nuclear Responsibility, BULL. ATOM.

Oct. 1976, at 8.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.

SCIENTISTS,

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
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well, South Carolina, could become the first multinational chemical reprocessing facility under IAEA control, and could blend natural uranium with the reprocessed plutonium to make nonweapons-grade fuel.49
On April 7, 1977, President Carter announced significant
changes in domestic nuclear policies aimed at decreasing the risk
of nuclear proliferation.-" Carter withdrew support for the Clinch
River fast-breeder reactor program and the Barnwell, South Carolina, chemical reprocessing plant in an effort to "defer indefinitely" the use of plutonium as fuel.5' The policy decision was
restated several weeks later in The National Energy Plan:
It is the President's policy to defer any U.S. commitment to advanced nuclear technologies that are based on the use of plutonium
while the United States seeks a better approach to the next generation of nuclear power than is provided by plutonium recycle and the
plutonium breeder. The U.S. will defer indefinitely commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium. The President has proposed
to reduce the funding for the existing breeder program, and to redirect it toward evaluation of alternative breeders, advanced converter reactors, and other fuel cycles, with emphasis on nonproliferation and safety concerns. He has also called for cancellation of
construction of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Demonstration
Project .
5
This represents a drastic change from Carter's earlier position advocating multinational reprocessing and storage facilities (see
Carter's United Nations address, supra). Congress, however, has
demonstrated substantial resistance to the elimination of the
breeder reactor program. The revival of the breeder reactor program may salvage the Barnwell reprocessing plant, since the plant
would provide fuel for a breeder reactor.
On April 27, 1977, Carter proposed the Nuclear NonProliferation Policy Act of 1977. In his accompanying message to
Congress, Carter emphasized several differences from previous
proposals.2 Recipients of United States nuclear material under
future agreements for cooperation would be required to have all of
49. Id.
50. CarterProposes to Ban the Use of Plutonium, Wall St. J., April 8, 1977,
at 2, col. 2.
51. Id.
52. Executive Office of the President-Energy Policy and Planning, The Na-

tional Energy Plan XX (1977).
53.

2

NUCLEAR REG. REP.

(CCH)

20,053, at 16,337 (1977).
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their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Old agreements
would be renegotiated in an attempt to conform with new export
conditions. Incentives such as uranium resource assessment, spent
fuel storage, and guaranteed supplies of low enriched (nonweapon-grade) uranium would be provided to discourage other
countries from obtaining enrichment and reprocessing facilities. 4
Under Carter's plan, an international Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program would be established to develop energy systems
which do not use or produce weapons-grade radioactive material."
Such a program holds great promise of an effective technological
solution to the proliferation problem.
The Administration's proposal would cut off nuclear supplies
and aid to those nations violating IAEA safeguards or detonating
a nuclear device, and it would require future agreements for cooperation to impose conditions allowing the United States to approve
the disposition of the nuclear material after transfer to the recipient country. 6 Under the Nuclear Explosive Proliferation Control
Act, the President would be given final authority to approve nuclear exports, but under the new proposal the executive branch
would be given authority to disapprove an export if it found that
such export would be inimicable to the common defense and security57 (see section VII, "Recent Administrative Action"). Apparently Carter intends to wield a strong hand in non-proliferation
matters, both domestically and internationally.
V.

RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

The 94th Congress (sitting during 1975 and 1976) greatly increased its attention to the problems of nuclear nonproliferation,
but passed only one law on the subject of nuclear export policy."
Section 305 of the International Security Assistance and Arms
Export Control Act adds section 669 to the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961.11 This section was added in order to cut off military and
economic aid to those countries who deliver or receive enrichment
or reprocessing materials or technology without IAEA safeguards
54.

Id.

55. Id. at 16,339.
56.

Id.

57. Id. at 16,338.
58. Bauser, United States Nuclear Export Policy: Developing the Peaceful
Atom as a Commodity in International Trade, 18 HAv. INT'L L.J. 227.
59. International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L.
No. 94-329, § 305, 90 Stat. 755 (1976).
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(or multilateral supervision and management). The President may
override the effects of the amendment if he certifies to Congress
that (1) the termination of assistance would adversely affect vital
United States interests, and (2) he has been assured that the country in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or
assist other nations in doing so. Congress reserves for itself the
power to cut off economic and military aid to those countries posing the threat of nuclear weapon development.
In 1976 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy reported favorably on the Nuclear Explosive Proliferation Control Act (Act).6o The
stated purpose of the bill is:
1. To establish a comprehensive proliferation control policy of the
United States which includes major proposed initiatives on the part
of this Government with other nuclear supplier states and other
countries of the world to strengthen, standardize and make more
effective the international regimes for safeguarding and controlling
the export of nuclear material, facilities, components and technology which could be of significance from the standpoint of the proliferation of nuclear explosives; and
2. To clarify and strengthen the [nuclear export] criteria which
this Government will itself apply, pending further international
agreements.'
Under the Act, the United States would give increased moral and
financial support to the IAEA, urge wide adherence to the NPT,
and declare United States intentions to become a reliable supplier
of nuclear fuel services. 2 Establishment of a nuclear exporters
agreement (or cartel) and nuclear fuel cycle centers under international control would be authorized in furtherance of United States
3
non-proliferation policy.
Of particular interest are the provisions in the Act which would
have the United States open negotiations with other nations aimed
at setting up procedures to deal with violations of the NPT or its
principles. Subsection 5(a)(4) calls for international agreement on
60. H.R. REP. No. 1613, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976). The bill has been
reintroduced in the 95th Congress by Rep. Price of Illinois as H.R. 17. See 123
CONG. REC. H78 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1977).
61. H.R. REP. No. 1613, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1976). See Nuclear Explosive Proliferation Control Act, H.R. 17, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-2 (1977); H.R.

REP. No. 1613, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1976).
62.

H.R. REP. No. 1613, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976).

63. Id. See Nuclear Explosive Proliferation Control Act, H.R. 17, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 5 (1977); H.R. REP.

No. 1613, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1976).
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"procedures to be followed in the event that any nation violates the
principles of the [NPT], whether or not such nation is a party to
the [NPT]. . . ." Similarly, subsection 5(a)(5) calls for an international agreement to establish procedures for the recovery of nuclear material diverted by any nation, group, or person in violation
of NPT principles.
These enforcement provisions are likely to attract a good bit of
attention, especially because they stand out from those portions of
the Act which merely restate policy already enunciated by United
States officials. They would begin the process of arming the international proliferation control regime with much needed enforcement sanctions. The strength or form of control procedures remains uncertain and the question arises whether any procedure
might be rendered ineffective by the same political conflicts that
now inhibit United Nations Security Council action.
The clarification and strengthening of United States nuclear
export criteria under the Act would be accomplished by amending
the Atomic Energy Act to require consultation and greater cooperation between various government agencies before export licenses
or agreeinents for cooperation would be approved. Agreements for
cooperation would still be negotiated by the Secretary of State,"
submitted to the President, and then approved by Congress. Under
the Act, the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA) would jointly negotiate the agreements and
render technical assistance; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
would consult on such agreements; the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency would render its views on the proposed agreement; and the appropriate congressional committees
would have access to the views of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the adequacy of safegards in the proposed agreement."
Thus, full consideration would be given to nuclear proliferation
factors. and safeguards.
All future agreements for cooperation would forbid the recipient
country to use the transferred material for development of any
explosive device and require the recipient country to consult with
the United States concerning changes in the safeguards. clauses.66
Export control over nuclear material and technology is also tight64.
in 42
65.
66.
Sess.

Exec. Order No. 10841, 3 C.F.R. 375 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted
U.S.C. § 2153 (1970).
H.R. REP. No. 1613, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1976).
Nuclear Explosive Proliferation Control Act, H.R. 17, 95th Cong., 1st
§§ 8(b)-(c); H.R. REP. No. 1613, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1976).
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ened by requiring the exchange of information and opinions between certain government agencies. The principles governing nuclear exports would require a complete range of safeguard guarantees by the recipient countries.
Perhaps the most onerous requirements for the corporate exporter and the recipient country to accept are those which prohibit
chemical reprocessing of fuel used or produced by the exported
material and technology without United States approval." Such
provisions would serve non-proliferation, but would also put the
United States exporters in a less competitive position due to the
recipient's probable aversion to extra conditions and restrictions.
The conflict between non-proliferation goals and a healthy United
States export market demonstrates the real problems facing most
non-proliferation schemes.
Like the amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, the proposed
proliferation control legislation would allow the President final
authority to approve an export if withholding such export would
prejudice United States non-proliferation goals or the common defense and security."
VI.

THE REACTION OF INDUSTRY TO RECENT
NON-PROLIFERATION TRENDS

The conflict inherent in striving to control nuclear proliferation
while the United States' position in the world nuclear industry
declines is fully appreciated by the United States nuclear industry.
Industrial spokesmen support United States non-proliferation
objectives " but fear the economic consequences of recent proposals. The industry places part of the blame for the halving of the
United States' share of the total world nuclear export market on
uncertain export policies, although increased competition from
West Germany, France, Canada, Japan, and Sweden is also
7
deemed a significant factor. 1
Opposition to the export of chemical reprocessing technology has
been attacked by some industry advocates as hypocritical interfer67. Id. § 15(a)(5); H.R. REP. No. 1613, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1976).
68. Id. § 14; H.R. REP. No. 1613, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-10 (1976).
69. Atomic Industrial Forum's Committee on Nuclear Export Policy, U.S.
Nuclear Export Policy 1 (July 21, 1976) (the Committee is composed of individuals employed by major atomic corporations) [hereinafter cited as Atomic Industrial Forum Policy Statement].
70. Id.
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ence in the legitimate economic interests of foreign nations.7 '
Doubts expressed by Ford and Carter that chemical reprocessing
of nuclear fuel is economical have been challenged." Carter's call
for a three-year moratorium on the export of reprocessing and enrichment technology has been similarly criticized:
[The moratorium] is still bound to sound a trifle presumptuous to
industrial countries with little or no indigenous fuel resources,
especially coming from a country which ran out of enrichment capacity two years ago, has totally failed to establish any commercial
reprocessing capacity, and whose leading exporter of reactors
[Westinghouse] has even failed to supply its contractual commit73
ments of uranium ore.

The nuclear industry also warns the United States Government
against applying negative sanctions to uncooperative nations since
this would encourage development of indigenous fuel facilities 74 at
a much greater total cost.7 5 Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner Victor Gilinsky criticized the Atomic Industrial Forum's sublimation
of the proliferation risk in its statement on U.S. nuclear export
policy. Gilinsky said the statement misrepresented the ease and
practicality of obtaining weapons-grade plutonium from a nor7
mally operating power reactor. 1
At least two United States nuclear industry proposals would be
entirely consonant with non-proliferation goals: the provision of
nuclear fuel services to other nations and the maintenance of consistent export procedures and requirements.7 7 These policies would
71. "[Tjhe greater irony is that the countries complaining most about the
spread of reprocessing knowhow are those who have so far dismally failed to
provide reprocessing, spent fuel storage, or waste disposal facilities for the large
numbers of nuclear power reactors already operating in their own countries."
Smith, Hang-up on Export of Reprocessing Knowhow Hard to Justify, NUCLEAR
ENGINEERING INT'L, Sept. 1976, at 5.
72. "All the objective studies and assessments of reprocessing and plutonium
recycle we have seen to date have shown quite unequivocally that these phases
of the fuel cycle are not only economic but that they represent as much as one
third of total available fissile fuel resources. Try telling the Japanese that they
do not need that extra 30 per cent of nuclear fuel supply! " Smith, Ford Statement Comes 20 Years Too Late, NucLEAR ENGINEERING INT'L, Dec. 1976, at 3.
73. Id. at 3-4.
74. Atomic Industrial Forum Policy Statement, supra note 69, at 1.
75. Smith, supra note 71, at 5.
76. Gilinsky, Plutonium, Proliferation and Policy 9 (Nov. 1, 1976) (speech

delivered at M.I.T.). See Atomic Industrial Forum Policy Statement, supra note
69, at 2.
77. Id. at 2-3.
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encourage nuclear energy trade and at the same time help control
the spread of nuclear weapons.
VII.

RECENT ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

On June 21, 1976, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued its
first written opinion on an export matter, demonstrating the important and direct relationship between export policy and nonproliferation policy. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,7 8 the Commission approved the export of a nuclear reactor to Spain-a country
which has not signed the NPT. Shortly thereafter, an export application to sell special nuclear material (fuel) to India was approved
in the case of Edlow Int'l Co." Both export applications prompted
a vigorous dissent by Commissioner Victor Gilinsky who feels
IAEA safeguards are inadequate to meet the proliferation threat
where a nation has not signed the NPT or made similar assurances.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act,8" the Commission considered four factors in the Westinghouse export application: "(1)
whether an agreement for cooperation would apply; (2) whether
the applicant is a foreign or alien corporation; (3) whether the
export would be inimical to the common defense and security of
the United States; and (4) whether the export would be inimical
to the health and safety of the American public."81 Only the third
factor-whether the export would be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States-emerged as a major issue
dividing the Commission. On the basis of information furnished by
the State Department, the majority found IAEA safeguards adequate in light of the peaceful use guarantee Spain has given for all
material irradiated in reactors supplied by the United States. The
majority stated that either the United States (in the case of United
States fuel governed by the United States-Spain Agreement for
Cooperation82 ) or the IAEA (in the case of non-United States fuel
governed by the IAEA/United States/Spain Trilateral Agree78. 2 NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH)
79. Id. 30,085 (1976).

30,080 (1976).

80. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et. seq. (1970), as amended by Act of Aug. 17, 1975, Pub.
L. No. 73-377, § 2, 88 Stat. 473 and Act of Dec. 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89
Stat. 1111.
81. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 2 NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH)
30,080, at
27,446 (1976). See 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1970).
82. Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, March 20, 1974, United StatesSpain, 25 U.S.T. 1063, T.I.A.S. No. 7841.
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ment 3) must approve the safeguards against diversion before fuel

may be reprocessed. 4 "Constructive diplomacy" was found the
better way to improve proliferation control in comparison to unilateral action which would hurt the United States' position as a
reliable supplier of fuel and decrease United States influence over
foreign nonproliferation guarantees. The Commission soundly reasoned that a change in the supply conditions for this reactor would
not affect the practice of the other eight reactors in Spain supplied
by the United States or the reactors supplied by other countries. 5
Dissenting, Commissioner Gilinsky distrusted the quality of
IAEA safeguards covering non-United States fuel which could be
used in the power reactor in question. He insisted the United
States could maintain control over the spent fuel by requiring
Spain to use only fuel governed by the United States-Spain Agreement for Cooperation. 6 Fearing the development of a reprocessing
capability by Spain and the resultant stockpiling of plutonium,
Gilinsky plainly doubted the ability of the IAEA to detect or prevent a diversion to explosive use. Gilinsky was also skeptical of the
ability of the IAEA to properly supervise a potential Spanish re7
8
processing safeguards scheme.

Edlow International Company's application for the export of
special nuclear material (uranium fuel) to India raised issues similar to the Westinghouse export application. The Commission approved the export application because, under the United StatesIndia Agreement for Cooperation, India can only use the transferred material at its Tarapur power station. The United Atates
retains the right to repurchase any special nuclear material produced. 8 Gilinsky again objected because of India's impending
chemical reprocessing capability, her nuclear explosive program,
89
and her failure to sign the NPT.

The supplying of nuclear material and technology to nonsignatories to the NPT (such as India and Spain) puts the United
States in a difficult situation. If the United States supplies fuel to
83. Agreement for the Application of Safeguards, Dec. 9, 1966, IAEA-SpainUnited States, 17 U.S.T. 2351, T.I.A.S. No. 6182.
84. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 2 NucLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) 30,080, at 27,451
(1976).
85. Id. at 27,452-53.
86. Id. at 27,459.
87. Id. at 27,461.
88. Edlow Int'l Co., 2 NucLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) 30,080, at 27,487-88 (1976).
89. Id. at 27,488.
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these nations, it contributes to the risk of diversion to explosive use
and possibly discourages signing of the NPT. But if the United
States denies fuel or technology to any nation, it will force many
nations to recognize the insecure status of an increasingly important fuel supply, and thus encourage them to remedy the situation
by developing enrichment and reprocessing capabilities.
ViL.

RECENT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

Recent activities at all levels of the federal government point out
the need for increased diplomatic activity aimed at stronger international agreements dealing with nuclear weapon proliferation
risks. Groundwork for an effective international proliferation control regime has already been accomplished. The success of this
control regime will doubtless depend on the strength and coordination of international action in the next decade.
Through an exchange of letters on January 27, 1976, ambassadors from Britain, Canada, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United
States, and West Germany agreed to impose stricter nuclear export controls." After the sale of reprocessing equipment to Brazil
by West Germany,9 ' the United States had requested the secret
meetings in London which led up to the agreement. Nuclear fuel,
reactors, uranium enrichment plants, and chemical reprocessing
plants were covered by the seven-nation agreement which attempted to make uniform the export policies of the nations involved. The supplier nations agreed to mutual consultation on
proposed nuclear exports and to uniform export policies in order
to minimize competition for nuclear sales.2 Recipients of nuclear
material and technology will have to provide physical security for
material received and must assure the exporters that no nuclear
explosions of any type will be attempted with the imports. IAEA
safeguards would be applied to all nuclear material (instead of just
fuel) to prevent reproduction or re-export of nuclear plants outside
the safeguards realm.93 Reportedly, the multinational reprocessing
center concept, which would enable closer and easier supervision
of the plutonium separation process, was rejected, despite United
States' support.9 4 The London Nuclear Suppliers' Conference met
90.

KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 27,626

91.

Id.

92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id.

(Mar. 12, 1976).
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again in secret during June 3 and 4, 1976, and was joined by representatives from East Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Sweden.95
In the recent past, increased competition to sell nuclear facilities
has not been conducive to an adequate safeguards system with
highly regulated access to plutonium. In their readiness to make a
nuclear sale, some nations tend to minimize safeguards or sell
reprocessing facilities despite a serious risk of proliferation. Brazil,
for example, came to the United States with its reprocessing plant
order but was turned away (some say by indecision) into the eager
arms of German industrialists." s Similarly, Libya's leader, Col.
Moamar Khaddafi, was turned down by India and France in his
request for a nuclear power reactor, whereupon the Soviet Union
agreed to build the nuclear plant for the volatile Khaddafi in exchange for Mediterranean naval bases and access to Libyan oil.9"
In order to meet the threat posed by economic, political, and
ideological competition, a nuclear exporters cartel has been suggested.9 8 The cartel or market-sharing arrangement would assure
nuclear exporters a certain share of the export market in return for
a promise not to sell enrichment or reprocessing facilities.99
Legal objections to, and the practical difficulties inherent in, a
nuclear suppliers market-sharing cartel appear almost insurmountable. First, determination of a nation's fair market share of
the nuclear export market would prove extremely difficult, especially in light of suspicions that the United States is seeking to
shore up its deteriorating market position."°9 Second, a nuclear
suppliers cartel would, arguably, violate section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act unless held exempt as governmental action.,0 "
However, where United States security objectives are concerned,
United States policy opposing cartels has not been very strong.12
95. KEESING'S CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVEs 27,816 (July 9, 1976). Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland reportedly were ready to join the nuclear suppliers group.
96. InternationalProliferationof Nuclear Technology: Oversight Hearingson
Nuclear Energy Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the
House Comm. on Interiorand InsularAffairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1975).
97. CordialEntente: Libya-Soviet Union, To THE POINT-INT'L, Jan. 10, 1977,
at 22.
98. Mandelbaum, A Nuclear Exporters Cartel, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Jan.
1977, at 42; Ribicoff, A Market-SharingApproach to the World Nuclear Sales
Problem, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 763 (1976).
99. Mandelbaum, supra note 98, at 43.
100. Ribicoff, supra note 98, at 43.
101. Id. at 780.
102. Id.
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Finally, if a cartel were set up and did overcome legal objections
it still might stifle competition to develop safer and more productive nuclear power systems. Once a particular nation's share of the
world nuclear market was determined, how would a particular
corporation's share be alloted within the national share?
IX.

CONCLUSION

The proliferation of nuclear weapons poses a serious threat to
world peace and security. Like many threats, proliferation will
only arouse concerted and decisive opposition as the problem becomes more immediate. For the present, economic and political
motives conflict sharply with the goal of stopping the spread of
nuclear weapons. The energy crisis of recent years has created a
desire by most nations to obtain an independent energy supply,
including nuclear reactors. Increased use of nuclear energy will
undoubtedly create a greater risk o:Pnuclear weapon proliferation,
yet there are steps which can be taken to minimize the risks involved.
The United States cannot act alone through export policy to stop
the spread of nuclear weapons. Unilateral action will defeat both
economic and non-proliferation goals by sending nuclear customers to other suppliers and by furthering an atmosphere of unreliability sufficient to prompt development of indigenous nuclear fuel
services by the non-nuclear weapon nations. Support of all nations
should be sought and channeled through the IAEA. The London
group of nuclear suppliers should affiliate themselves closely with
the IAEA. It is conceivable that the group could become a component of the IAEA, much as the Security Council is now a component of the United Nations. The IAEA, the nuclear exporters, and
concerned nuclear importing nations should establish a set of powerful sanctions to apply to those countries breaching the NPT,
IAEA safeguard agreements, or any law in obtaining nuclear material for explosive purposes. Procedures for applying such multilateral sanctions should be thought out well in advance, as a crisis
may not allow time for deciding if a nuclear boycott, a complete
economic boycott, or intervention would be appropriate.
Large multinational fuel centers to enrich and reprocess nuclear
fuel and to store and treat radioactive material would help centralize the safeguards system and make the monitoring task much
easier. These multinational fuel centers could be supervised by the
IAEA whether they are located in the United States or at various
locations throughout the world. An international control regime
'with powerful political and trade sanctions would be in a strategic
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position to enforce the NPT and the IAEA safeguard agreements.
The IAEA and its supporters could further their nonproliferation goals by developing and instituting safe and effective
nuclear waste disposal methods. By helping solve the environmental threat posed by nuclear energy, the IAEA could furnish an
attractive alternative to national stockpiling of nuclear material
and thereby gain greater control over the nuclear fuel cycle risks.
Multinational waste disposal centers would further demonstrate
the utility and safety of concerted control efforts at the international level.
Public concern in the United States over the safety risks, including weapons proliferation, have helped put the United States in
a less prominent leadership position in nuclear matters. Greater
competition from other industrialized nations (both those with and
without nuclear weapons) also helped diminish the United States
position of leadership. While the anti-nuclear sentiment may be
based on entirely rational fears, it must be recognized that the
inhibiting effect on the United States' domestic nuclear industry
will probably not further international control of the proliferation
threat.
Reservations expressed by Ford and Carter over the economic
value of chemical reprocessing may not find support in light of the
rising price of uranium and recent studies presenting the economic aspects of reprocessing. Some nations may demand reprocessing strictly to lessen their dependence on the nuclear suppliers.
From a United States perspective, the best way to meet this demand is to encourage the construction of large facilities such as the
one at Barnwell, South Carolina, which could be located in various
regions around the world under IAEA control. Individual reprocessing plants serving each nation would clearly be the least attractive alternative, considering the ulterior motives of some nations requesting repr6cessing plants.
The Nuclear Explosive Proliferation Control Act allows the
United States to support and participate in the type of control
regime which will minimize the risk of nuclear weapon proliferation. By encouraging agreements with other nuclear suppliers, the
bill reaffirms the United States' policy of limiting the spread of
nuclear weapons. It provides for the flow of information during
nuclear export negotiations and decisions resulting in agreements
for cooperation, insuring closer scrutiny of United States nuclear
relationships with other nations. Most importantly, the Nuclear
Explosive Proliferation Act or any similar comprehensive legislation would point out the need for international agreement to control the supply of weapons-grade nuclear fuel.
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The groundwork for effective proliferation control has already
been established. Prevention of diversion by terrorists can be accomplished through tighter physical security measures and stockpiling of special fissionable material only under IAEA control. Prevention of diversion by national governments is probably a more
difficult task but will be accomplished, if at all, through greater
international cooperation. An effective international control regime must have power over the supply of special nuclear material,
especially at the enrichment and reprocessing stages. Enrichment
and reprocessing under international auspices would allow the
IAEA to supply the nuclear fuel needs of the world without a great
risk of diversion to military use.
Organizing, policing, and financing a nuclear suppliers marketsharing cartel would constitute a near-impossible task because of
the wide political and economic differences among the supplier
nations. One positive aspect of such a cartel-the elimination of
safeguards as an item of competition-may be instituted by international agreement outside the context of a market-sharing cartel.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977 proposed by
the Carter Administration contains many proposals which would
be extremely effective if adopted by all of the nuclear supplier
nations. Unfortunately, the continuing worldwide energy crisis will
likely force many nations to disregard the serious environmental
and proliferation risks of nuclear technology. The National Energy
Plan recognizes but does not appreciate the fact that many nations
in the world do not have a vast supply of natural fuel sources such
as coal to fall back on. With this in mind, the United States should
prepare for the continued and expanded use of plutonium as a
nuclear fuel by other nations.
John Dewar Gleissner

